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Abstract 29 
Decisions about support for predictions of theories in light of data are made using statistical 30 
inference. The dominant approach in sport and exercise science is the Neyman-Pearson significance-31 
testing approach. When applied correctly it provides a reliable procedure for making dichotomous 32 
decisions for accepting or rejecting zero-effect null hypotheses with known and controlled long-run 33 
error rates. Type I and type II error rates must be specified in advance and the latter controlled by 34 
conducting an a priori sample size calculation. The Neyman-Pearson approach does not provide the 35 
probability of hypotheses or indicate the strength of support for hypotheses in light of data, yet 36 
many scientists believe it does. Outcomes of analyses allow conclusions only about the existence of 37 
non-zero effects, and provide no information about the likely size of true effects or their practical / 38 
clinical value. Bayesian inference can show how much support data provide for different hypotheses, 39 
and how personal convictions should be altered in light of data, but the approach is complicated by 40 
formulating probability distributions about prior-subjective estimates of population effects. A 41 
pragmatic solution is magnitude-based inference, which allows scientists to estimate the true 42 
magnitude of population effects and how likely they are to exceed an effect magnitude of practical / 43 
clinical importance thereby integrating elements of subjective-Bayesian-style thinking. While this 44 
approach is gaining acceptance, progress might be hastened if scientists appreciate the 45 
shortcomings of traditional N-P null-hypothesis-significance testing. 46 
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1.0 Introduction 63 
Science progresses by the formulation of theories and the testing of specific predictions (or, as has 64 
been recommended, the attempted falsification of predictions) derived from those theories via 65 
collection of experimental data [1, 2]. Decisions about whether predictions and their parent theories 66 
are supported or not by data are made using statistical inference. Thus the examination of theories 67 
in light of data and progression of ‘knowledge’ hinge directly upon how well the inferential 68 
procedures are used and understood. The dominant (though not the only) approach to statistical 69 
inference in the sport and exercise research is the Neyman-Pearson approach (N-P), though few 70 
users of it would recognise the name. N-P inference has a particular underpinning logic that requires 71 
strict application if its use is to be of any value at all. In fact, even when this strict application is 72 
followed, it has been argued that the underpinning ‘black and white’ decision logic and value of such 73 
‘sizeless’ outcomes from N-P inference are at best questionable and at worst can hinder scientific 74 
progress [3-6]  The failure to understand and apply methods of statistical inference correctly can 75 
lead to mistakes in the interpretation of results and subsequently to bad research decisions. 76 
Misunderstandings have a practical impact on how research is interpreted and what future research 77 
is conducted, so impacts not only researchers but any consumer of research. This paper will clarify 78 
N-P logic, highlight limitations of this approach and suggest that alternative approaches to statistical 79 
inference could provide more useful answers to research questions while simultaneously being more 80 
rational and intuitive. 81 
 82 
2.0 The origins of ‘classical’ statistical inference. 83 
The statistical approach ubiquitous in sport and exercise research is often mistakenly attributed to 84 
British mathematician and geneticist Sir Ronald Fisher (1890 – 1962). Fisher introduced terms such 85 
as ‘null hypothesis’ (denoted as H0) and ‘significance’ and the concept of degrees of freedom, 86 
random allocation to experimental conditions and the distinction between populations and samples 87 
[7, 8]. He also developed techniques including analysis of variance amongst others. However, he is 88 
perhaps better known for suggesting a p of 0.05 as an arbitrary threshold for decisions about H0 that 89 
has now achieved unjustified, sacrosanct status  [8]. Fisher’s contributions to statistics were 90 
immense, but it was Polish mathematician Jerzy Neyman and British statistician Egon Pearson who 91 
suggested the strict procedures and logic for null hypothesis testing and statistical inference that 92 
predominate today [9].  93 
 94 
3.0 Defining probability. 95 
The meaning of probability is still debated among statisticians, but generally speaking, there are two 96 
interpretations. The first is subjective and the second objective. Subjective probability is probably 97 
the most intuitive and underpins use of statements about probability in everyday life. It is a personal 98 
degree of belief that an event will occur e.g. “I think it will definitely rain tomorrow”. This is an 99 
interpretation of probability generally applied to theories we ‘believe’ to be accurate accounts of the 100 
world around us. In contrast, the objective interpretation of probability is that probabilities are not 101 
personal but exist independent of our beliefs. The N-P approach is based on an objective, long-run-102 
frequency interpretation of probability proposed by Richard von Mises [10]. This interpretation is 103 
best and most simply illustrated using a coin-toss example. In a fair coin, the probability of heads is 104 
0.5 and reflects the proportion of times we expect the coin to land on heads. However, it cannot be 105 
the proportion of times it lands on heads in any finite number of tosses (e.g. if in 10 tosses we see 7 106 
heads, the probability of heads is not 0.7). Instead, the probability refers to an infinite number of 107 
hypothetical coin tosses referred to as a ‘collective’ or in more common terms a ‘population’ of 108 
scores of which the real data are assumed to be a sample. The collective / population must be clearly 109 
defined. In this example, the collective could be all hypothetical sets of 10 tosses of a fair coin using 110 
a precise method under standard conditions. Clearly, 7 heads from 10 tosses is perfectly possible 111 
even with a fair coin, but the more times we toss the coin, the more we would expect the proportion 112 
of heads to approach 0.5. The important point is that the probability applies to the hypothetical-113 
infinite collective and not to a single event or even a finite number of events. It follows that 114 
objective probabilities also do not apply to hypotheses as a hypothesis in the N-P approach is simply 115 
retained or rejected in the same way that a single event either happens or does not, and has no 116 
associated collective to which an objective probability can be assigned. This might come as a 117 
surprise, as most scientists believe a p value from a significance test reveals something about the 118 
probability of the hypothesis being tested (generally the null). Actually a p value in N-P statistics says 119 
nothing about the truth or otherwise of H0 or H1 or the strength of evidence for or against either one. 120 
It is the probability of data as extreme or more extreme than that collected occurring in a 121 
hypothetical-infinite series of repeats of an experiment if H0 were true [11]. In other words, the truth 122 
of H0 is assumed and is fixed, p refers to all data from a distribution probable under or consistent 123 
with H0. It is the conditional probability of the observed data assuming the null hypothesis is true, 124 
written as p(D|H). I contend that what scientists really want to know (and what most probably think 125 
p is telling them) is the probability of a hypothesis in light of the data collected, or p(H|D) i.e. ‘does 126 
my data provide support for, or evidence against the hypothesis under examination?’. The second 127 
conditional probability cannot be derived from the first. To illustrate this, Dienes [12] provides a 128 
simple and amusing example summarised below: 129 
P(dying within two years|head bitten off by shark) = 1 130 
Everyone that has their head bitten off by a shark will be dead two years later. 131 
P(head bitten off by shark|died in the last two years) ~ 0 132 
Very few people that died in the last two years would be missing their head from a shark bite so the 133 
probability would be very close to zero. Knowing p(D|H) does not tell us p(H|D) which is really what 134 
we would like to know. Note that the notation ‘p’ refers to a probability calculated from continuous 135 
data (interval or ratio) whereas ‘P’ is the notation for discrete data, as in the example above. Unless 136 
the example requires it, the rest of this paper will use ‘p’ when discussing associated probabilities 137 
and will assume that variables producing continuous data are the topic of discussion. 138 
 139 
4.0 Neyman-Pearson logic and decision rules. 140 
N-P statistics are based on the long-run-frequency interpretation of probability so tell us nothing 141 
about the probability of hypotheses of interest or how much data support them. Neyman and 142 
Pearson were very clear about this and in the introduction of their seminal paper to the Royal 143 
Society stated “… as far as a particular hypothesis is concerned, no test based on the (objective) 144 
theory of probability can by itself provide any valuable evidence of the truth or falsehood of that 145 
hypothesis” [9]. Instead, they set about defining rules to govern decisions about retaining or 146 
rejecting hypotheses such that, by following them, in the long run, wrong decisions will not often be 147 
made.  148 
The starting point of the N-P approach is the formation of a pair of contrasting hypotheses (H0 and 149 
H1). For example, H0 could be that μs (population mean time to fatigue given supplement �) = μp 150 
(population mean time to fatigue given placebo), or to put it another way, the difference between μs 151 
and μp is zero. The alternative (H1) could be μs > (μp + 20) i.e. that the supplement will increase time 152 
to fatigue by at least 20 units. Note that H0 need not be ‘no difference’ (μs = μp) as is usually the case. 153 
It could be a hypothesised difference or even range of differences that ought not to be possible 154 
given the theory being tested. In fact, under the philosophy of Popper, the latter constitutes a far 155 
more severe test of a theory, such that survival of the test (i.e. failure to reject H0) offers strong 156 
corroboration for the theory [1]. By the same token, H1 ought also to be a specific difference or band 157 
of differences because merely specifying that μs – μp > 0 is a vague prediction, rules out little and 158 
allows for any effect greater than 0. Furthermore, with continuous data, an effect of zero has a 159 
probability of precisely zero as does any exact integer so such an H0 is always false! It would be 160 
fruitful to elaborate on this link between philosophy and statistical inference, but it is a digression 161 
from the issue at hand, which is how N-P statistics proceed from here.   162 
The two hypotheses should be mutually exclusive such that if H0 is rejected, then by deductive logic 163 
H1 is assumed true and vice versa, if H0 is not rejected, H1 is assumed false. However, statistical 164 
inference and indeed science does not deal in absolute proofs, truths or falsehoods, there is always a 165 
magnitude of uncertainty. If this uncertainty is extended to this example of N-P logic, we have: If H0 166 
then probably NOT H1, data arise consistent with H1, therefore H0 is probably false. 167 
This logic has been challenged. Pollard and Richardson [13] highlight a flaw using the following 168 
example: ‘if a person is American, they are probably not a member of Congress; person � is a 169 
member of Congress therefore person � is probably not American’. Furthermore, Oakes [11] points 170 
out that we are concluding the truth of H1 based on H0 being unlikely, when H1 might be even less 171 
likely but we shall never know as it has not been tested nor has the likelihood of multiple other 172 
possible versions of H1. This paradox has been called the fallacy of the transposed conditional [3]. 173 
N-P logic gives rise to two possible errors in decision making, namely wrongly rejecting H0 when it is 174 
actually true (type I error) and wrongly retaining H0 when it is actually false (type II error). Neyman 175 
and Pearson devised procedures whereby the acceptable risk of each type of error were specified in 176 
advance of testing (subjectively and according to the type of error the researcher deemed more 177 
harmful), and were then fixed and controlled such that, over an infinite number of hypothetical 178 
repeats of the experiment, the probability of making each type of error was known [9]. The 179 
probability of a type I error is termed α and is conventionally and without reason set at 0.05. The 180 
probability of a type II error is termed β. This error rate is less formally agreed and in the majority of 181 
research in sport and exercise is never actually specified or controlled, violating N-P decision-rule 182 
logic. The few studies that do control β generally specify it at 0.2 giving the study an 80% chance (1 – 183 
β) of correctly rejecting a false H0 or having 80% statistical power. That researchers class the 184 
consequences of a type II error as less harmful than a type I error is interesting and the discussion of 185 
this could form a paper in its own right. Nevertheless, for the type II error rate to be fixed, a 186 
minimum worthwhile / interesting effect that researchers wish to detect must be specified in 187 
advance of data collection, and an appropriate sample size calculated that provides the power (and 188 
thus the type II error rate) deemed acceptable. Exactly that number of participants should be tested 189 
to control the type II error rate at the specified level. Failure to specify β in advance and ensure it is 190 
controlled by testing an appropriately-sized sample renders decisions about H0 impossible in 191 
situations where it cannot be rejected. It can also result in effects not large enough to be of practical 192 
/ clinical importance being deemed ‘significant’ if a larger-than-necessary sample is collected (i.e. the 193 
experiment is overpowered).    194 
In the time-to-fatigue example outlined previously, having specified hypotheses and error rates and 195 
calculated an appropriately-sized sample, a sample (assumed to be random) is taken from the 196 
population(s) of interest. The sample means for the supplement (Ms) and the placebo (Mp) and the 197 
difference between them can be calculated. The standard error of the mean difference (SEMdiff) can 198 
also be calculated. These values are then used to calculate a sample statistic that combines them, in 199 
this case a t statistic, where t = (Ms – Mp / SEMdiff). In order to calculate the long-run probability that 200 
such a t statistic could occur given H0 is true, the collective that gave rise to this t statistic must be 201 
defined. The collective in this case is a probability distribution of t statistics from an infinite number 202 
of hypothetical repeats of the experiment assuming H0 is true (so having a mean of 0 and an 203 
assumed-normal distribution). The distribution represents all values of t that are probable given H0. 204 
Now the decision rule is applied by defining a rejection region of the distribution where t statistics 205 
are deemed so extreme that they would occur infrequently in the long run if H0 is true. The 206 
probability of obtaining a t  score in that region is equal to the predefined α. Thus, if the observed t 207 
from the sample data falls into the region of the probability distribution beyond α, in the N-P 208 
approach, H0 is rejected as such a t statistic would occur infrequently in the long run if H0 were true. 209 
Note that the interpretation such a finding is that ‘an effect exists that should not be likely if there 210 
really was no effect’. Little can be concluded about the size of the effect or the practical / clinical 211 
value of it, which is arguably much more important [3, 4] (see Fig 1) 212 
 213 
Fig 1. A distribution of probable t scores given H0 of no mean difference between μs and μp. Note, the 214 
shaded rejection region (representing possible values of t as or more extreme than that observed) is 215 
in a single tail of the distribution because H1 in the example above is a directional hypothesis i.e. μs > 216 
(μp + 20). Note μs is the population mean time to fatigue after a nutritional supplement, μp is the 217 
population mean time to fatigue after a placebo, H0 and H1 denote the null and experimental 218 
hypotheses respectively.  219 
 220 
Note that the exact probability of the observed t is irrelevant to the decision to reject H0. It need 221 
only be less than α. Furthermore, having set α at 0.05, upon a significant result with p of 0.004, an 222 
author should not report significance at p < 0.01 because this was not the long-run error rate 223 
specified before data were collected. This is fairly common though. The requirement for authors to 224 
report exact p values is also redundant and stems from a mistaken belief that the calculated p is in 225 
some way a measure of strength of evidence against H0 such that the lower the p the stronger the 226 
evidence against H0 and by extension for H1. This common misinterpretation of p reveals the 227 
researcher’s true interpretation of probability i.e. that it is subjective and can be assigned to 228 
individual events and hypotheses. This interpretation of probability forms the basis of Bayesian 229 
statistical inference that will be introduced shortly. Most researchers probably believe the p value 230 
tells them something about the probability of their hypothesis in light of the data i.e. p(H|D), and 231 
that the magnitude of p is in some way a continuous measure of the weight of evidence against H0, 232 
when in fact, any given p could simply be a function of random sampling variation [14]. Note also the 233 
desire for p to indicate ‘magnitude’ of evidence in this example. The importance of estimating the 234 
likely ‘size’ of an effect has been recognised as a more important goal of statistical inference [3, 4, 235 
15] 236 
 237 
4.1 Other criticisms of Neyman-Pearson statistics 238 
N-P statistics are sensitive to the conditions under which a researcher chooses to stop collecting 239 
data and perform the analysis, called the stopping rule. For example, a stopping rule could be (and 240 
often is) ‘test as many participants as is common in the area of interest’. Unless the number of 241 
participants happens to match that required to achieve a predefined power to detect a smallest 242 
worthwhile effect, this rule is poor. Power is not controlled at any known value and the probability 243 
of type II error is unknown. Should a non-significant result arise, the researcher cannot know if the 244 
sample statistic arose by chance alone and H0 should be retained, or the study was not powerful 245 
enough to reject H0 when it was actually false. The only conclusion to draw is one of uncertainty. 246 
Another illegitimate stopping rule is to carry on testing participants until a significant result is 247 
achieved. The issue here is that, even if H0 is true, a significant result is guaranteed to occur 248 
eventually i.e. both power and α are 1. The legitimate stopping rule under the N-P approach is to 249 
calculate the sample size that will yield the required power and β before data are collected, then test 250 
that number of participants. An amalgam of the two illegitimate stopping rules described here is 251 
setting out to test the number of participants common in the area, and upon analysing the data and 252 
finding a non-significant result, adding a few more and testing again to find a significant result (say p 253 
= 0.03). The type I error rate for the ‘second look’ cannot be 0.05, it must be higher because there 254 
have been two attempts to reject H0 (it is actually a little under 0.1). Furthermore, the associated p 255 
value of the second attempt is associated with a different collective to the first attempt i.e. a 256 
collective defined by the stopping rule ‘test the common number of participants, if not significant, 257 
add more until significant’. To retain α of 0.05 for the two attempts, each attempt must be carried 258 
out at a lower α level. There are many approaches to this, the simplest being the Bonferroni method 259 
where each attempt is carried out at an α of 0.05/k and k is the number of attempts to reject H0. This 260 
problem arises any time more than one H0 is tested and is a particular problem where effects not 261 
specified as being of interest before data collection catch the researchers attention after data 262 
collection. For example, the research might specify one particular comparison, but the researcher 263 
threw in some extra (two) conditions while there was access to the participants, and the additional 264 
comparisons show effects that appear interesting. The only effect that can be tested at the 0.05 265 
level is the one specified in advance of data collection. The others must be tested at a lower level 266 
because they belong to a collective defined by ‘perform three t tests: if any of them are significant at 267 
α of 0.05, reject that H0 ’ which actually has an α of just under 0.15 (almost a 15% chance of type I 268 
error). The ‘family’ of tests to perform must be specified before data are collected. This seems 269 
illogical as most scientists would agree that if data suggest an interesting effect, why should it 270 
matter when you chose to think about the effect. Scientists that think this way are believers in the 271 
likelihood law, which put simply, is that all the information relevant to inference is contained in the 272 
data [16]. N-P statistics violate the likelihood law because inferential decisions are based on when 273 
one chose to think about interesting effects. Given this situation, the value of N-P statistics for 274 
making valid inferential judgements about hypotheses has been questioned [3, 4, 11]. Note that 275 
while the preceding section has discussed ‘significance’ testing, the same issues (i.e. multiple testing, 276 
unplanned comparisons etc.) also apply to confidence intervals calculated in the frequentist-277 
probability framework, though it must be acknowledged that interval estimation is superior to and 278 
more informative than the dichotomous decision procedures of null-hypothesis-significance testing 279 
as it offers some estimate of the likely magnitude of an effect though such estimates are still not 280 
often framed against pre-determined ‘interesting / worthwhile’ effects. Many users of frequentist 281 
confidence intervals prefer a 95% interval estimate and interpret these in relation to whether the 282 
interval spans zero – hence essentially still ‘testing’ for a null hypothesis of zero effect at a threshold 283 
alpha of 0.05 and somewhat missing the point of ‘estimating’ the likely magnitude of a population 284 
effect [4, 6]. 285 
 286 
5.0 Bayesian inference – combining prior knowledge with observed data    287 
It seems that most scientists wish statistics to provide probabilities of their theories being correct 288 
and in fact many believe that a N-P p provides this. This is not and cannot be the case with objective 289 
probabilities. It can however be the case with a subjective probability. Bayesian inference allows 290 
scientists to alter initial degree of belief in a hypothesis in light of experimental data. It is likely that 291 
most readers will not have heard of the Bayesian approach as N-P methods are the dominant and 292 
unchallenged approach in sport and exercise research and most other sciences. Given that most will 293 
scarcely recognise the names of these methods, let alone understand the conceptual differences and 294 
issues of their use, unquestioning adoption of N-P statistics is hardly an informed choice.  295 
Bayes theorem was developed by fellow of the Royal Society, Reverend Thomas Bayes (1702-1761) 296 
while working on the problem of assigning a probability to a hypothesis given observed data. The 297 
theorem is directly derived from the axioms of probability theory such that: 298 
p(H|D) = p(D|H) × p(H)/p(D) 299 
p(H) is called the prior is a probability distribution of the unknown population effect suggested by 300 
the researcher prior to collecting any data. p(H|D) is the posterior and is the probability distribution 301 
of the unknown population effect (the prior) altered in light of the data that were collected. It 302 
represents how prior estimates about an effect should be changed based on observations. p(D|H) is 303 
the probability of the observed data arising given the prior estimated effect and is called the 304 
likelihood of the hypothesis. It is distinct from the p(D|H) described in N-P statistics where the 305 
hypothesis is held constant and the probability of data that did not occur but might have is 306 
considered. Conversely, likelihood is p(obtaining exactly this sample mean|prior estimated effect) 307 
where the likelihood of different effects (e.g. population means) are considered, but the data are 308 
fixed. Fig 2 shows the distinction between the meaning of p(D|H) in significance testing versus 309 
Bayesian inference. Note the location of the effect of interest (mean difference) on the x axis in each 310 
approach. Most researchers “think” like a statistician interested in likelihoods (panel B), yet apply a 311 
statistical approach that does not mirror their beliefs (panel A).  312 
 313 
Fig 2. Likelihood in Neyman-Pearson and Bayesian inference. (a) – a distribution of probable sample 314 
means given H0 of ‘zero’ difference; (b) – a distribution of probable population means given the 315 
actual observed sample mean. (Ms – Mp) in both panels is the location of sample mean difference in 316 
time to fatigue after supplementation and placebo respectively. The height of the likelihood curve in 317 
panel (b) shows which population mean difference (in this example) is likely given the data. The 318 
shaded area in (a) are values for mean difference that are unlikely assuming H0 of zero difference. 319 
                              320 
The outcome of a Bayes analysis is generally expressed as an interval estimate for the magnitude of 321 
the true population effect, called a credibility interval. This is similar to a confidence interval except 322 
that it can be claimed that this interval has a specified probability (say 95%) of including the true 323 
population effect.   However, the subjective choice of the components (e.g. mean and SD) of a prior 324 
probability distribution for the estimated-unknown population effect can be difficult to defend and, 325 
given the same data, two scientists with different prior opinions would obtain different posterior 326 
distributions and estimates of the true population effect. Nevertheless, careful consideration of 327 
what constitutes a practically / clinically meaningful effect, prior to data collection, is not only a 328 
worthwhile venture but a must for meaningful interpretation of data analysis. While it is a 329 
requirement of N-P inference to specify a smallest-worthwhile effect to control type II error, 330 
‘significance’ and therefore conclusions relate to rejection of a zero-effect H0 and is generally 331 
irrespective of effect magnitude and therefore of questionable value [3, 4]. 332 
 333 
6.0 Magnitude-based inference: a pragmatic solution? 334 
The frequentist use of probability dominates sport and exercise sciences, yet Bayesian incorporation 335 
of prior beliefs is something that most scientist probably do if not formally at least subconsciously 336 
and likelihood-based methods of inference are clearly more intuitive. The days of a clear divide 337 
between Bayesian and frequentist philosophies have passed, and pragmatic statisticians [17, 18] and 338 
scientists [4, 15] now recommend and practice approaches that combine a frequentist approach to 339 
with elements of Bayesian thinking. One such approach, magnitude-based inference [4] focusses on 340 
estimating the magnitude of population effects with reference to a priori  subjective estimates of 341 
practically / clinically worthwhile effect magnitudes, without the complication of expressing the 342 
latter as a probability distribution.  Moreover, the tools and instructions required to perform and 343 
interpret such analyses are readily available [19] whereas common statistical-software packages do 344 
not offer options for full Bayesian analysis or other hybrid methods such as the calibrated Byes 345 
approach [18].  346 
 347 
7.0 Summary and recommendations 348 
Significance testing is designed to provide a reliable procedure for making black and white decisions 349 
for accepting or rejecting (usually zero-effect) null hypotheses with known and controlled long-run 350 
error rates. If that is what a scientist wishes to know, then all is well, but type I and type II error rates 351 
must be specified in advance and ought to be based on careful thought about potential costs 352 
incurred by each type of error, not dictated simply by convention. It follows that sample size must be 353 
determined in advance and that the resulting number of participants are tested to ensure type II 354 
error rate is controlled. The outcome of an analysis allows conclusions about the mere existence of 355 
non-zero effects but provides no information about the likely size of true effects or their practical / 356 
clinical value.  357 
If a scientist wishes to estimate the true magnitude of an effect and how likely it is to exceed an 358 
effect magnitude of practical / clinical importance, while allowing for elements of subjective 359 
Bayesian-style thinking, magnitude-based inference provides a solution. While this approach is 360 
gaining acceptance, progress might be hastened if scientists appreciate the shortcomings of 361 
traditional N-P null-hypothesis-significance testing. In summary, it is up to the individual scientist to 362 
decide what they wish statistics to do for them and be aware of which approach is best suited to this 363 
purpose. 364 
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